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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD F. SLAUGHTER, 
Plaintiff a;nd Respondent, 
-VS.-
:\[ARIAN T. SLAUGHTER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 10602 
BRIEF OF AP·PELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce filed by the husband. 
Appellant sought to avoid a divorce on the ground that 
the court was without jurisdiction by reason of the lack 
of statutory residence of the respondent. In the alterna-
tive, if the court determined it had jurisdiction, appel-
lant sought a divorce in her favor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court determined it had jurisdiction and 
granted a divorce in favor of appellant, awarded to her 
custody of the minor son of the parties, made a division 
of property, and granted to appellant alimony and sup-
port money. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT Or\ ~\PPEAL 
Appellant seeks the aid of this eonrt to obtain ,
1 
property settlem0nt, alimony and support money mori· 
f:worable to her than that allowed h~· th(• low0r C'onrt. 
STATE~LB~XT OF FACTS 
The parties were manie(l in Salt Lake City, Utah in 
1042 (R. 80). At the time of th0 trial the r0spedin• n;;h 
of appellant and respondellt were 48 and 30 ~·ears (R. 8\t, 
35). Three ehildren were born of the marriage as fol. 
lows: Mary, a married daughter; .Janeen, age J fl, ,rli11 
v»as a student at the Uni,·ersity of Virginia; and Donald. 
horn in 1053. Respondent was a member of the arm:,] 
forces of the United States at the time of the m:1~Tia<;1 
(R. 3fi) and continued as sueh until he retired as a C'ololll·l 
in August, 1965 (R. 94, 3G). During the marriage, re-
spondent \\'aS stationed in 1rnm0rous places in the r11it-
ed States, also in German~· and Thailand. Appella11t and 
family were with respondent while he was in Europe arnl 
most of the places in the United States (R. 98). )farital 
trouble which :finally led to separation of the parties Ol'-
rurred at about the time respondent went to Thailand in 1 
1962. Appellant complains that respondent had n plan 
to leave his familv. Another woman was im·oh·pd (R. 
79, 80). In any ennt, respondent did leaw the fnmih· , 
home and refused to return (R. 79). At the time nt 
the trial appellant was living in the home of the partie• 
in Arlington, Virginia, and respondent \ms li\·ing ir 
Bellevue, "'\Vashington, and was employed by the Hi1d1· 
land College in the State of ·w ashington. Donald, tlw ' 
minor son, was li,·ing with his mother in Virginia. 
2 
POIN'l' NO. 1 
TII1'~ LOWER COURT ,\BPSED ITS DISCRE-
TION TX THE DIVISIOX OF PROPERTY 
,\X}) IX TIU~ F1XIXG OF THE .. urorxT OF 
.\ LL\IOXY XWARDED \\~HIC'H REQPIRES 
( 'OTilH~<'TTOX BY THIS COFRT. 
Tlte followiug is a list of thl' pro1wrty of the parties 
:11H1 t Ii(• \·alrn• placl'd therl'on: 
lI11nw iu Virginia (Valur $26,000.00 ll'ss 
mortg-age of $14,000.00 )------------··------·-···········-$12,000.00 
TT nm<' in Salt Lake City, Utah .................... _________ 19,000.00 
flni<'k automobile -----·--··-------------·-···--------··--·--·--··---· 800.00 
\'olkswagon automobile --·-----------------------·--·-----·---- 1,000.00 
:-.\;n-i1w..; Account in the joint names of thl' 
parties: 
Deserl't Federal Savings & Loan 
"\ssociation, Salt Lake City, Utah____________ i,407.00 
A.rlington Fairfax Sa,·ings & Loan 
Association, Arlington, Virginia ---·-------- 9,852.00 
Cumberland Valley Savings & Loan 
Association, Carlisle, Pa. ------··-------·-··------- 3,238.00 
Sn,·ings Acronnt in Arlington Fairfax Sav-
iugs & Loan Association, Arlington, Vir-
ginia, in joint names of parties and 
.Tanl'en Slaughter (daughter) ---------------------- 2,040.00 
Sa,·ings Account in Arlington Fairfax Sa,·-
ings & Loan Association, Arlington, Vir-
ginia, in joint names of parties and 
Donald Slaughter (son) -----------------------------·-- 182.00 
~:1 - $100.00 Fnitl'c1 States Savings Bonds 
in t 110 joint names of the parties ... ----------------- 2,600.00 
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Corporate stock in joint names of parties 
(which was sold by respondent after di-
vorce action commenced) Exhibit No 1 ' . ' 
Sale price ---------------------------------------------------------- 15,556.00 
Inheritance from respondent's mother ______________ 15,000.00 
Total --------------------------------------------------$88,675.00 
No value was placed on the household furniture 
of the parties, some of which was in possession of earh 
of the parties at the time of the trial. 
In addition to the furniture in her possession, thr.· 
lower court awarded to appellant the follov.'ing-: 
H . v· .. ome m irgmia ----------------------------------------------------$12,000.00 
Buick automobile --------------------------------·------------------- 800.00 
Three Savings Accounts in the names of the 
parties ---------------------------------------------------------------- 20,497.00 
Total __________________________________________________ $33,297.00 
The lower court awarded to respondent furniture 
in his possession and the following: 
Corporate stock sold by respondent, sale price .. $15,556.00 
Volkswagen automobile ------------------------------------------ 1,000.00 
Savings Bonds ---------------------------------------------------------- 2,600.00 
Two Savings Accounts with the children____________ 2,222.00 1 
Home in Salt Lake City, Utah ______________________________ 19,000.00 
Total ----------------------------------------------$40,378.00 
Factors which should be considered in determin-
ing the property rights of the parties are enumerated in 1 
Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P. 2d 265, and MacD011-
4 
alrl Y. JfacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2cl 1066. Applied 
to the parties in this action some of said factors are: 
At tltc time of the marriage -
He was 26 and she was 24 years of age (R. 25, 80). 
He was in the armed forces; she was a school 
teacher (R. 35, 98). 
He had an automobile; she had seven or eight 
hundred dollars in savings and a trousseau 
(R. 94). 
The health of both was good. 
Both \Yere college graduates (R. 35, 93). 
At the time of the divorce -
The duration of the marriage was 24 years (R. 80). 
His health was good - her health was poor. 
II e had an income in excess of $1,400.00 per month 
($736.30 take-home pay from Highland College 
and $642.17 army retirement pay (R. 94, 95). She 
had no income and was entirely dependent upon 
him (R. 93, 94). 
He was 50 years old and had a life expectancy of 
approximately 23 years. She was 48 years old and 
had a life expectancy of approximately 29 years. 
Children of the marriage consisted of one daugh-
ter who was married, one daughter who was 19 
years of age and attending college, and a boy, 
age 12, living with his mother (R. 81). 
,\n inheritance of $15,000.00 was acquired by re-
spondent from his mother before the divorce ac-
tion was filed (R. 95). Respondent had conrtibuted 
approximately $2,500.00 to his mother over a pe-
riod of some senn years before her death in 1964 
(R. 89). 
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This oourt said in Wilso11 v. "Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 279 
' 296 P. 2d, 977, 979: 
" * * * Tl t' · 1 · 1 · t . ie cour s respons1 n r y is to endeaYor 
to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their 
economic resources so that the parties can rec011 _ 
struct their lives on a happy and useful basis. 
In doing so it is necessary for the court to con-
sider, in addition to the relative guilt or inno-
cence of the parties, an appraisal of all of the at-
tendant facts aud circumstances: The duration 
of the marriage ; the age of the parties ; their 
social positions and standards of living; their 
health; considerations relative to children: the 
money and property they possess and how it wa;:: 
acquired; their capabilities and training and their 
present and potential incomes.'' 
The lower court failed to provide a ''just and equi-
table adjustment" of the resources of the parties. Such 
failure occurred both with respect to the division of 
property as well as in fixing the amount of alimony. 
Excluding furniture, the value of the property 
awarded is $33,297.00 to appellant and $40,378.00 to re-
spondent. Respondent received an inheritance from his 
mother having the value of $15,000.00 (R. 95). The 
lower court failed to include the inheritance as part of 
the resources of the parties subject to division. Such 
was tantamount to awarding the inheritance to respond-
ent. The value of the property awarded to respond-
ent, including the inheritance is $55,378.00 which is 63% 
of the total assets and exceeds the value of the portion of 
the property awarded to appellant by the sum of 
$22,000.00. 
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). __ t1mittcdly most of the assets of the parties were 
acquired through the earnings of respondent. However, 
appellant was qualified as a school teacher and taught 
school for a portion of the time during the marriage 
(R. 93). ::\Iost of the Savings Accounts had been accumu-
lated from allotment checks which went to appellant 
and \H•rc s~ffed by her (R. 88). Thus the earnings of 
appellant and her frugality are highly significant factors 
which contributed materially to the resources of the 
parties. 
The court, in Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17 Utah 2d. 
293, 409 P. 2d 972, in effect approved an award to the 
\Yife of substantially one-half of the property of a value 
of $175,000.00. In addition she received a Cadillac auto-
mohile, $550.00 per month alimony, and protection of 
$1;'50,000.00 of life insurance. The marriage was only 
four years longer than that in the case at bar and all 
of the four children were adults, three of whom were 
married. We submit that equity and justice require an 
equal diYision of the property between the parties in the 
case at bar. Yet, excluding the inheritance, the trial 
court would have appellant take $7,000.00 less than 
respondent and, with the inheritance included, the appel-
lant comes out with $22,000.00 less than respondent. In-
heritance is a factor which should have been considered 
hy the lower court in determining the property rights 
of the parties. (MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra.) Exclu-
sion of the inheritance from the resources of the parties 
in the division made by the lower court was an abuse of 
discretion. Such abuse is all the more glaring in the 
case at bar by the fact that the resources of the parties 
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~were diminished in the approximate sum of $2,500.00 hY 
contributions made by respondent to his mother. . 
The lower court awarded alimony and support monev 
to appellant in amounts of $300.00 and $100.00 per montl; 
' respectively. The undisputed evidence is that the mini-
mum needs of appellant total $492.00 per month (R. 92); 
that she is presently unable to pursue her career as a 
school teacher (R. 94) ; that she is entirely dependent 
upon respondent for support and maintenance (R. 94): 
and that prior to separation, respondent made an allot-
ment to her in the sum of $800.00 per month (R. 100). 
The evidence also sho-\''s that respondent has an income 
in excess of $1,400.00 per month, consisting of $736.30 
take-home pay from Highland College in the State of 
Washington and $642.17 per month army retirement in-
come. It is reasonable to expect respondent's income 
will continue in the same or increased amounts for ap-
proximately 15 years until normal business retirement at 
age 65. He will have the army retirement income for life. 
It is also reasonable to assume appellant will have no 
income. The lower court would have appellant and minor 
son get by on $400.00 per month while respondent, after 
paying the alimony and support money, would still han 
$1,000.00 per month for himself. This is an abuse of 
discretion. 
There is no problem in this case of trying to cut "one 
blanket to cover two beds" as stated by the court in Mac-
Donald v. MacDonald, supra. Fortunately, respondent's 
income is sufficient to permit appellant to be sustained in 
a manner somewhat comparable to that which she has 
8 
I 
heen accustomed without injury to respondent. The 
s~andard of living to which appellant has been accustomed 
is rrflected somewhat by the allotment of $800.00 per 
month made for her by respondent prior to separation. 
F'or the trial court to limit appellant to alimony in the 
sum of $300.00 per month is an abuse of discretion. The 
trial court would deny appellant the privilege of living 
h:' her accustomed standard although the income is suf-
ficient to permit this to be done without prejudice to 
re«ponclent. The trial court would permit respondent to 
retain for his living expenses more than three times the 
amount allowed to appellant therefor. The inequity of 
the decree of the trial court is further magnified by the 
fact that respondent gets a tax deduction for alimony 
paid while the already meager award to appellant is re-
dncNl by the tax she is required to pay. 
All that has been urged heretofore has been without 
('Onsideration as to the guilt or innocence of the parties. 
This court indicated in Wilson Y. Wilson, supra, that 
mmitive measures have no place in a divorce decree. 
1 However, the court observed in the Wilson case "that 
the court may, and as a practical matter invariably does, 
l'o11sider the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties 
to their marriage vows, and their relative guilt or inno-
cence in causing the breakup of the marriage * * *.'' The 
reconl is brief hut clear and undisputed that respondent 
is responsible for the "break up of the marriage." He 
left appellant; refused to live with her; refused to return; 
worked out a plan to leave his family; disturbed another 
family and became involved with another woman (R. 79, 
80). Regardless of the foregoing, appellant was willing 
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to take him back (R. 70) and made clear to the court lH·r 
true feelings ·were that she did not desire a divorce (R. 
116). In the Wilson case the husband had fallen in loH 
with another woman. The trial c'.:lurt awarc10d the 1\·ifo 
almost all of the propert~- and alimony in 1110 sum of 
$5,000.00. The husband complained that the trial comt 
had penalized him for falling in Ion~ with another 
woman. This court upheld the award to the wife of almoRt 
all the property but modified the decree with respeet to 
alimony from $5,000.00 to $2,400.00 By way of con-
trast, in the case at bar it would app0ar that th<" trfol 
court would penalize the innocent party who is willilll!' 
to forgive and forget and who had attempted to prese1Te 
the marriage and that it would reward the philanc1Pn'1· 
who has "walked away" from the marriaµ;c and 1rn11t 
"out." 
The function of the appellate court in a diY01w 
action has been stated in two recent cases as follows: 
M artinett v. M artinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P. 2d 821: 
"We are in accord with the postulate advocated 
by the defendant that divorce proceedings lwinQ' 
in equity, this court will review the eviaence nnd 
may substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court if circumstances warrant doing so. XeYer-
theless, it is firmly established in our law that the 
trial judge will be indulg·ed considerable latitude 
of discretion in adjusting the financial and prop-
ertv interests of the parties; conversely, howeYer, 
if there is such serious inequity as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion, this court will make thi> 
modification necessary to bring abont a just re-





(}raziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P. 2d 931: 
"* • * Termination of the marriage being inevi-
table, the object to be desired was to fashion a 
<lecree which would be just and equitable under 
the circumstances and, insofar as possible, mini-
mize the animosity which had developed; and to 
provide the best possible basis for the parties to 
reconstruct their lives in a happy and useful man-
ner, with primary concern for the welfare of their 
rhilcl. \Ve remain mindful of the propriety of in-
<lulging deference to the judgment of the trial 
court in that regard and of not lightly disturbing 
it. Yet under the broad powers of review in 
eCJuity with which this court is endowed, when a 
(li\·orce decree is under attack, it has always been 
regarded as an attack upon the whole decree, and 
when it appears that there is an abuse of discre-
tion so that an inequity or injustice is wrought, 
the court has proceeded to make such adjustments 
as it deemed necessary to do justice between the 
parties and to give effect to the purpose just 
mentioned above.'' 
We respectfully submit that equity and justice re-
quire a modification of the decree to award to appellant 
at least one-half of the property and alimony commen-




Appellant sought to resist the divorce on jurdisdic-
tional grounds. The trial court summarily resolved tlit-
jurisdictional question (R. 77) and indicated that he> wa, 
obligated by reason of the law in this state to grant a 
diYorce (R. 116). The true feeling of appellant is rlear 
that she does not desire a divorce (R. 116). If the law 
is such that a diYorce must be forced upon her against 
her will at least she should not be penalized by being 
deprived of her rightful share of the accumulated prop-
erty and of sufficient funds to permit a eomfortahle li\·ing. 
Proper application to the case at bar of the factors used 
to determine the property rights of the parties leads tn 
but one conclusion that "serious inequity" and "aliu~1· 
of discretion" in the decree of the trial court requirP 
modification and adjustment by this court in order to 
accomplish justice and equity in behalf of appellant. 
Respedfully submitted, 
HAROLD R. BOYER 
Of ROl\INEY & BOYER 
1409 vValker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defenda11t-
Appellant 
